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No.: 35119
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware
Corporation,
;I

Plaintiff,

DISTRICT COURT OF THE
FIRST JUDICAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Dl AND FOR THE STATE
OF IDAHO

And
SPECTRA SITE, LLC,
Real Party In Interest - Respondent,

CV 2003 462 1

vs.
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

I

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for Kootenai County
Honorable John T. Mitchell, presiding

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
Douglas P. Lawrence &
Brenda J. Lawrence
4925 N. Webster Street
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83815
Tel.: (208) 704-0644
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APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
Spectra Site notes that the Lawrences' brief contains cites to the Capstar record and
argues that those facts and cites are simply irrelevant to this case. Spectra Site does not specify
which facts and cites are irrelevant, nor do they cite any law to support their argument. Rather,
they claim that this Court should only consider on appeal, those contained in the clerk's record
for this case.
However, the trial court noted in it's decision regarding Tower Asset theories,
"Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstark easement by implicationfrom prior use,
easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls." [RVol3 p. 652 L.
12-13] Spectra Site also recognizes on page 12 of the Respondent's Brief, that the trial court
incorporated its previous analysis of the three easement theories from Capstar, and concluded
that Hall had the same easement rights.
In making its findings of fact and determinations in Tower, the trial court obviously
considered the Capstar record as being relevant. Since the trial court included the Capstar record
in its decision regarding Tower, the cites to the Capstar record is completely relevant to this case.
When a court considers a motion for summary judgment in a case that would be
tried to a jury, all facts are to be liberally construed, and all reasonable inferences
must be drawn in favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms, 119 Idaho
at 517,808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,
876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994)
This case has been in litigation since June 2003. At no time prior to the present has
Tower taken any action to separate its proceedings from that of Capstar. To the contrary, Tower

hired the same local consul, generally filed similar briefs on the same day, scheduled hearings

for the same day, and made the same arguments and referenced the same evidence in both
matters.
In particular, the deposition of Harold Funk was taken and transcribed for both cases. Mr.
Whelan began his examination by saying:
Good morning Mr. Funk. As I told yon when we arrived here today, my name is
John Whelan. I'm a lawyer in Coenr d'Alene, and I represent Dong and Brenda
Lawrence in a lawsuit filed by a company by the name of Capstar and a company
by the name of Tower Asset Sub. There's actually two lawsuits pending. And, for
the uumose of this, we're essentiallv taking one deposition for both lawsuits.
[Funk Deposition 4:9-4: 181
One FUNK deposition was taken for both lawsuits. Mr. Craig Vernon represented both
Capstar and Tower Asset at the Funk Deposition and made no objection to the taking of one
deposition for both lawsuits. Therefore, any cite to the Funk Deposition, would be applicable to
either case. Spectra Site has not presented any argument to the contrary.
Spectra Site also argues that failure to cite authorities and statues in the initial brief, with
reference to the issues presented on appeal, are deemed waived and cite I.A.R. 35 (a)(6) as the
controlling authority.
While I.A.R. 35 does specify the content and arrangement of briefs, it does not state that
the failure to cite authorities and statues to issues presented on appeal are deemed waived.
Furthermore, Spectra Site's argument with regards to the initial brief, seems to go against I.A.R.
34(f)(l) Augmentation of Briefs.

At any time before the issuance of an opinion, any party may supplement his brief
by the citation of additional authority, identifying the issue on.appeal to which it
pertains, without written comment thereon, and identifying the headnote or
relevant pages of the authority cited. This augmentation may be done by ,written
notice to the court and aU parties without first obtaining leave of the court.
Spectra Site further argues on page 12 of their Response Brief, that the trial court did not
rule that the footnote comment by the Supreme Court relieved Spectra Site of proving that its
landlord Hall, had an easement right which it could claim the benefit. That the trial court merely
reviewed the chain of title and evaluated the intent expressed in the sales agreement to conclude
that the Halls had easement rights across the Lawrence parcel. Spectra Site's analysis is not only
difficult to understand, it is disingenuous and contrary to the record in this case. The issue(s)
Tower placed before the court in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary
Judgment, are not the same issue(s) Tower placed before the trial court at the hearing on their
motion for Summary Judgment. Contrary still, is the argument Spectra Site now offers in its
Respondents Brief.
At hearing, Spectra Site argued that this Court was of the opinion that the Hall's benefited
from an easement across the Lawrence parcel. And, the reason this Court remanded it back to the
lower court for further proceeding was to determine if Tower, as a lessee of the Halls, benefited
from the Hall's easement.
MS WEEKS: ... They noted in a footnote that there's not a dispute that Hall has a
right to use the road, and I believe they did that based on augmentation of the
record they requested at the Supreme Court level from another case that has not
been augmented to this court, but they put that right in the opinion that Hall has
the right to use the road. What they do say is that we can't quiet title of conrse in

Tower Asset, now SpectraSite. They remand it and say what this court is to look at
is with Hall having a right to use the road, what are the rights of - I'm going to
keep slipping and calling it Tower, Your Honor, because I've called it Tower for
so long, but I mean the new THE COURT: I understand.
MS. WEEKS: -the new SpectraSite. What rights did the new SpectraSite have to
use the road? Your Honor, I've given yon the Am. Jnr. which is the case law out
there. There is no case law that I have found that says otherwise which says a
tenant has the same right to use the road as his landlord. Since the Supreme Court
says that Mr. Hall has the right to use the road, Mr. Hall says that Tower is their
tenant. Nothings been presented to say Tower is limited on using the road by Mr.
Hall. Therefore, as a tenant they have a right to continue to use the road, and that
was what was remanded to this court to inquire into, Your Honor ... [TR p. 181 L.
3-p. 182L.51
The trial court reiterated this as being the controlling issue in its Memorandum Decision and
Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right
to use the easement. The Idaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." Tower Asset Sub., Inc. v.
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. [R Vol. 3 p. 649 4[ 21
Tower Asset correctly argues "the only issue remanded by the appellate court in
this case was whether Tower Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from
the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, Halls." [R Vol. 3 p. 650 L.
12-15]
At no time prior to Tower's Motion for Summary Judgment did Tower ever state that the
trial court was to perform an inquiry into Hall's rights to use the road. Hall was never a party to
this action and Tower's motion for summary judgment was not out to determine Hall's rights,
only Tower's. The inquiry into Hall's rights, simply, were never put before the trial court.

Spectra Site then asserts on page 14:
Lawrence argues that this Court's previous decision stands for the ~ r o ~ o s i t i othat
n
Spectra Site was precluded from arguing that their land was burdened by servitude
under any easement theory absent a prior quiet title action by Hall establishing
these rights. Lawrence cites no legal authority for this argument on appeal.
This Court has established that title ownership is a prerequisite to quiet title to an
easement appurtenant in favor of a dominant estate... As a result, Tower lacks standing to seek a
quiet title in its favor. However, since standing to enforce the right to use an easement is
consistent with the right to benefit from the easement, Tower will have standing to seek
injunctive relief if it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the Blossom
Mountain Road easement. Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 p. 3d 581
(2007).
Whatever rights Tower claims the Halls have to the Lawrence parcel, would necessarily
have to he perfected prior to any enforcement of said rights. That is the applicable law in this
case and the legal authority the Lawrences cite for this argument.
Spectra Site then argues, that the Lawrences' claim the trial court summarily dismissed
their evidence and completely ignored contradictory evidence, was only supported by several
facts the trial court got wrong. This is not the argument the Lawrences are making. Rather, the
Lawrences are making two arguments. One, that the trial court summarily dismissed the
contradictory evidence submitted by the Lawrences. Two, in addition to dismissing the
Lawrence's rebuttal evidence, the trial court also just got several of its facts wrong.

Listed on the following pages are two tables. The first is a table summarizing the rebuttal
evidence and the facts the evidence establish. The second table identifies the facts the trial court
just got wrong.

Location
Week's

Description of evidence
junk Real Estate Contract

Fact(s) testify to:
Funk's land purchase included:
Parcel A: Government Lot 3 Section 15

Affidavit

Parcel B: Southeast Quarter of Section 21
Parcel C: Government Lot 4
Southwest Quarter of Section 22
(excepting 1 acre)
FD 23:18 - 24:4

Funk

I

~ebositiontogether with Funk
/deposition Exhibit 4

1. Funk estate

/ 2. Contiguous parcels - no separation
13. Places Government Lot 3 in Southwest
Quarter of Section 15

FD 58:l-58:17

Funk

Deposition together with Funk
/deposition Exhibit 2

1. Existence of road that extends from Section

/ 21, through Section 22 and into Section 15
/ 2. Funk was familiar with road

3. Funk identifies the road as a logging road
Lawrence Copy of 1987 district court

Mellick Road as described in the Survey of

Affidavit judgment in

Mellick road by Col. W. H. Edelblute, August

R Vol2 p. case no. 65077

1907, and change in Mellick, survey by W. H.
Edelblute, April 1910 is declared to have been

283-285

at all times a public road in general.
Lawrence Copy of defendants motion

1. Defendants hired James P. Meckel, a

Affidavit for sanctions in case no.

professional engineer, to determine if Mellick

R Vol2 p. 65077, April 23,1987

road is the same Mellick road that County

286-302

Commissioners dedicated in 1910.
2. Based on affidavit of Jame P. Meckel, he
opinioned with reasonable engineering

1

I certaintv. that it was the same road.

Fact(&testify to:
Item Location Description of evidence
6 Lawrence Copy of 1907 viewers report 1. Establishes that Mellick road extends into
Affidavit & survey of Mellick by W.

the Southwest Quarter of Section 15

R Vo12 p. H. Edelblnte

298
Lawrence Affidavit of Bruce Anderson, 1. Opinioned that the Funks had a legal access

7

Affidavit County Surveyor for

to their lands via Mellick Road

R Vol2 p. Kootenai County

280-282

/

8

1 Deposition /

I I
9

FD 15:6-16:9

Funk

1

11 11
10

Funk

/ 2. Establishes road existed at time of purchase

I

13. Establishes that Funk didn't care to use the

/FD 59:3-59:20

1 Road exists in Government Lot 3

road because it had become overgrown

1

Deposition together with Funk
/de~ositionExhibit 2
R Vol. 1 Affidavit of John Mack

!1

1. Purchased Funks remaining interest in land
in Southwest Quarter of Section 22

p.52

I I

1. Establishes logging road

I

12. His property completely surrounds the Hall
parcel.
3. When he purchased his property in 1992,
there where two roads entering his property.
4. Another road via Mellick enters his

property.

/

11

Funk

1 Deposition /

FD 63:2-63: 15

U

Funk establishes the logging road as
/extendinginto the Southeast Quarter of
Section 21

Location
Funk

Description of evidence
FD 56%-57:5

Depositior together with Funk

Fact@)testify to:
1. Funk use of road to SW Quarter of Section

/ 21 only

deposition exhibit 2
Funk

FD 55:4-55:5

2. Funk not crossing Section 28
Funk didn't own land in Section 28

FD 53:25-54:18

1. Funk never sought easement in Section 28

Depositio~
Funk
Depositior

/

2. Anticipated putting in another access road

R. Vo12 p September 10,2007 affidavit Search of public records reveal the the Funks
397 9 5

of Douglas Lawrence

R. Vol. 3 November 13,2007
p. 515 qI 1: Affidavit of Douglas
R. Vol. 3 Lawrence together with
p. 517
Funk

never had an easement across Section 28
1. In 1977, Lawrence's predecessor in interest
/ i s granted an easement across Section 28.
12. If Funk had a legal access across Section

exhibit

/ 28, Lawrence's predecessors would not have

FD 263-2621

had to acquire one.
1. GTE provided the Funks with a key to the
gate

Funk

FD 18:lO-19:14

1. Road (Blossom Mountain) was gated by
/Wilber Mead

Depositior

/ 2. Gate was locked
3. Key was needed for access

Affidavit of Wilber Mead

1. Gate was locked from 1966 until 1998
2. To his knowledge, the only ones using the
gate from 1966 until 1972 was GTE

Funk
Depositior

FD 29:20-29:24

3. Granted an easement to the Funks in 1972
1. Mr. Funk moved in 1975
2. Mrs. Funk moved in svring of 1976

[ten
- Location
21
Funk

Description of evidence
FD 30:2-30:17; 31:15-31:17

2-3 times

Deposition

22

Funk

'

Deposition

/

FD 25:ll-25:23

/sold it to Human Synergistics, they had been
to the mountain 20-30 times.

Funk

FD 46:21-47:7

Deposition

Section 21 and Section 22
R. Vol2 p. July 24,2007 Affidavit of
304 ql2

Douglas Lawrence

p. 307 9

25

1. Affiant driven down Mellick Road as early
as 1996
2. On June 12,2007, Lawrence took pictures
of Mellick Rd.

10-14
R Vo12 p. Photography taken on June
266-271

Illustrates current condition of Mellick Road

12,2007 by Douglas
Lawrence

-

26

Mr. Funk thought the easement he bought
from Mead allowed him to go anywhere on

24

2. Never visited the property after 1981
1. In the six years between the time the Funks
Ipurchased the land in 1969, until the time t f q

I
23

Fact(&testify to:
1. After 1975, Funks only visited the propem

R Vo12 p. Access License Agreement
222

1. Nextel's use of Blossom Mountain was

between Nextel and

permissive

defendants dated 11/7/97

2. Nextel use started in 1997

together with
July 24,2007 affidavit of

27

-

Douglas Lawrence
R Vol2 p. July 24,2007 affidavit of

Defendants receives notice that Nextel is

!17 & 314 Douglas Lawrence together

assigning license agreement to Spectra Site

with exhibit letter

[ten
Location Description of evidence
28 R Val. 2 p July 24,2007 affidavit of
218 & 314 Douglas Lawrence together

R Val 2 p. July 24,2007 affidavit of

April 2007, American Tower offers

219 & 314 Douglas Lawrence together

defendants lump sum payment for amending

with exhibit letter

30

merges with American Tower

with exhibit letter

29

Fact@)testify to:
Defendants receive notice that Spectra Site

lease

R Vol 2 p. November 13,2007 affidavit 1. June 2007, holder of Nextel License

515 110 of Douglas Lawrence

agreement stops making payments.
2. Monthly payments were made regularly
and faithfully until June 2007, at which time
they just stopped.

31

R Vol 2 p. July 24,2007 affidavit of
314 1 4 5 Douglas Lawrence

rower Asset has an interest in the Nextel
License

-

32

Defendant never receives correspondence that

R Vol 2 p. iuly 24,2007 affidavit of

315148

Douglas Lawrence

1. At all times since the License Agreement,
Nextel has had a key to the Lawrence gate.

md defendants counter claim 2. Defendants have never interfered with
3gainst Nextel for breech of

Nextel's use of the easement.

:ontract

3. Defendants opinion that Nextel or
ruccessor filed complaint to get out of making

-

3ayments.

Item Location Court's Wrong Fact&)
1
R Vo13 p. The Metsker's map (at the August 7, 2007
630

Comment
There is no testimony from

hearings on motions to strike, this Court took Howard Funk.
judicial notice that Metsker maps have been
relied upon for decades, but not as to their
accuracv is not sufficient to contradict
Howard Funk's testimonv. The only
comuetition evidence of what existed in 1975
is from Howard Funk.

R Vol. 3

Capstar argues that the third element, present There is no affidavit from

p. 632

great necessity for the easement, is supuorted Thomas Mack
bv the affidavit of Thomas Mack.

R Vol. 3 p. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he

636

Rebeor's affidavit DOES

managed the tower site for Cavstar, and that

NOT show that he managed

on November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp.

the tower site for Capstar.

entered into an "Access License Agreement"
with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an
effort to avoid litigation...

t

R Vol. 3 p. On January 13,2003, Nextel assigned the
636

Access License Agreement to Capstar.

There was never any
assignment of the Nextel
License Agreement to
Caustar.

R Vol. 3 p. The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk's
638

Funk moved away from the

used the property consistently for the six vear area the same year he sold to
period from the dav he sold to Human
Svnergistics to the dav he moved from the

Human Synergistics (1975)

Funk owned the Lawrence
638

prescri~tiveuse Funks made of the

parcel from the years 1969 tc
1975 and could not have

1969 to 1975.

made a prescriptive use of hi

-

own land.

R Vol. 3 p. The language in the recorded sales contract

The language is the sales

639

provided notice to others that Funk were

agreement excepted from fee

claiming a rieht to use the road in the future

simple an easement

for ingress and egress to the lands the Funks previously granted to GTC
retained.

R Vol. 3 p. Lines 20-22 state:

8

643

I

I

Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an

Lines 5-6 state:
Tower Asset has made it

/easement to access it's equipment located on /clear that it is only seeking
Halls' property which Tower Asset leases

injunctive relief in this case

from the Halls.

and that Tower Asset is no
making any claim to title
over Lawrence's Land.

-

Date incorrect

9

R Vol. 3 p. The Halls' parcel was broken out in 1996

10

when the Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen.
643
R Vol. 3 p. Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996) Date incorrect
646

11

R Vol. 3 p. Soectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest p. 651 L. 20-21 states:
with Mark Hall and Robert Hall in a parcel of The uncontroverted evidence
647
property situated in the Southwest Quarter of by Robert Hall is "... that
Section 22 .... Affidavit of Daniel Rebeor

Tower Asset Sub. Inc.

(Tower Asset case files Julv 22.2003).

continues to lease the site
from us."

R Vol. 3 p. Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there

There is no lease in the

615 L. 3-7 is nothing contained in the copy of the lease

record between Tower Asset

between Tower Asset and Hall that

and Hall.

demonstrates a special agreement between
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may
not use an easement for which the Halls have
the benefit.
R Vol. 3 p. When the Lawrences questioned Tower

(647

This simply is not a true

Asset's right to access the property it leases

statement. The Lawrences

from the Halls over the portion of Blossom

enter into an access license

Mountain Road that traversed Lawrences',

agreement with Nextel in

Tower Asset filed suit on June 27,2003,

November 1997. The

seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive Lawrences never heard of
relief.

Tower Asset until they were
served this complaint.

R Vol. 3 p. The Idaho Supreme Court noted on appeal

/ 649
1

The Idaho Supreme Court

the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were

I Tower Asset had already

intended to have the right to use the

established that the Halls had

/thatTower Asset had already established that did not make a finding that
'

1 easement.

1 an easement across the
Lawrence parcel.

R Vol. 3 p. Tower Asset correctly argues "the only issue The issue remanded is

/ 650

jremanded by the appellate court in this case

/ "Tower will have standing to

was whether Tower Asset, as a tenant, has a

seek injunctive relief if it can

legal right to benefit from the Blossom

establish it has an alleged

Mountain Road easement of its landlord,

legal right to benefit from the

Halls"

Blossom Mountain Road

As lessee from the Halls, Tower Asset is

Signal Point Road does not

entitled to injunctive relief against Lawrence: :ross the Lawrence parcel.
as to use of this easement across Lawrences'
land for use of this road known as Signal
Point Road.
When Funks sold their portion of Section 21

:unk did not retain property

to Human Synergistics (Lawrences'

n Section 21 after the sale to

predecessor) in 1975, Funk still owned their

luman Synergistic

land in Section 22, and 'the sales agreement tc
Humin Synergistics included "Item 5 in the
sales agreement that "... indicated that the
Section 21 parcel was being sold subject to
an ingresslegress easement over the existing
road on the property that was being sold to
Human Synergistics. Without those terms
Funks' Section 21 prouertv would have been
landlocked.
Apparent continuous use from no later than

Nynn Wenker's affidavit

1975 is also shown by the Affidavit of Wynn estifies only to Verizon's use
Wenker.

f the road. Verizon had an
kasement across Blossom
dountain Road.

Capstar also argues there is no evidence to

7unk testifies at deposition

support Lawrence's allegation that Funks

hat he and his wife move to

moved to American Falls in 1975

iberdeenIAmerican Falls in
975

R Vo13 p. After Capstar filed its reply brief on
629

The Summary Judgment

summary judgment, on September 10,2007, hearing was scheduled for
Lawrences file yet another brief on summary September 24 and the filing
judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P.

was timely. Furthermore, on

56(c)).

September 17, Capstar
stipulated to a continuance.

R Vol. 3 p. Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the

636

The Funk, Rook, and

land has always been permissive" ignores the Rebeor's affidavits,
fact that Lawrences did not purchase their

collaborate the fact that their

property until 1996. Thus, in the years from

use of the road was

1966 to 1996, they are not competent to

permissive.

testify as to anything that occurred in that
period.
R Vol. 3 p. /The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks

There has been no evidence

and their successors relied on language in the submitted to support this
recorded sales contract as it is undisputed
that Funks and their successors then
proceeded to use the road openly,
continuously, without interruptions, under a
claim of right for much longer than the
statutory period requires.

finding.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
The Lawrence's are asking this court to decide if Summary Judgment was proper, based
on the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other evidence in the record. The Lawrence's argue
that the record overwhelmingly contains enough evidence to show that there exists real and
genuine issues that contradict Tower's version of the facts and that the Lawrences were in
opposition to a Summary Judgment finding. We further contend that the court did abuse its
discretion by entering a Summary Judgment against the Lawrences.
We ask this court to note that Tower did not provide a brief to this issue as this issue is
indefensible and uncontroverted.
DISOUALIFICATION
The facts are, both Capstar and Tower sue the Lawrences over every easement theory
conceivable and the trial court simply dismissed any evidence to the contrary and liberally
favored every argument the Plaintiffs made. From a pragmatic and rational viewpoint, it is
diff5cult to conceive how the trial court could find that Hall has an express easement, an
easement by necessity, an easement implied by prior use, and a prescriptive easement. From a
legal standpoint, its even harder to understand. Especially given the facts in this case.
It is simply hard to understand how the trial court could simply ignore the existence of
Mellick road and in particular a Metsker map from 1959, an affidavit from a licensed surveyor, a
prior court finding, Harold Funk's deposition testimony, the Lawrence's affidavit, photography,
satellite imagery, etc. In a summary judgment ruling, the facts are to be liberally construed in

favor of the party opposing the motion and he is to be given the benefit of all favorable
inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the evidence. And, it is quite clear that the
trial court did not liberally construe the facts in favor of the Lawrences.
Over the course of these past seven years, the Lawrences became increasingly convinced
that they could not and would not receive a fair and impartial trial from the trial court. There
comes a point when you realize that a person has simply closed their eyes to the facts, has quit
listening to reason, and there is absolutely nothing you can say or do that is going to overcome or
change a preconceived bias or prejudice. With the trail court, the Lawrences reached that point
some years ago and were totally unable to do a single thing about it.
A judge's impartiality in a matter can be determined. It can be determined simply by

asking the question, "Is the court willing to recluse itself?" Lf the answer is yes, then the answer
is obvious. The court is impartial. If the answer is no, then the answer is obvious as well.
A truly impartial court, would be absolutely impartial as to to whether or not it was the

finder and trier of fact. It has no personal interest in the matter at all. It has no motive, no
rational, and no reason to be involved. A fmly impartial court would conclude that the
appearance of justice is such an essential component to the courts position in the proceeding, that
without it, the administration of justice has not been served. On the other hand, a court that does
not recluse itself, can no longer claim that is it truly impartial. For the giving of any reason
shows that the court has a reason, a rational, or a motive to stay in the matter. It is irrespective

what that reason is. The court has a personal interest or a personal stake in the matter that the
court is intent on seeing through.
The appearance of justice is not an element that is separate and distinguishable from the
administration of justice. If the "product" of the court is the administration of justice. It is the
appearance of justice that allows the losing party to accept the court's decision. And, it is the
appearance of justice that gives the courts the respect by which to work within society and
communities.
In its memorandum of decisio~,the only rational the court gives for not disqualifying
itself, is an argument that the court harbors no bias towards the Lawrences or their attorney. It
certainly offered nothing that would convince the Lawrences of the court's impartiality and it
certainly did nothing to further the administration of justice in this matter.
There are two other issues closely related to the Lawrence's concerns over how the court's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned. One issues deals with an independent investigation
the court conducted and the other deals with how the court handled the admission of affidavit
testimony.
Tower provided no response in its brief relating to the issue of the court's independent
investigation. The trial court conducted an independent investigation into the Lawrence's motion
for disqualification by looking at files and records not related to the present matter and not
offered in as evidence. The court abused its discretion. And, Tower has not offered any rebuttal
or defense of this issue.

CONCLUSION
Tower Asset is the party that pursued the summary judgment ruling. They pursued this
action with the absolute confidence that the trial court would rule in their favor; just as the
Lawrences knew with absolute confidence the trial court would rule against them. That is why
the Lawrences pursued a motion for disqualification and why John P. Whelan filed a formal
complaint with the Idaho Judicial Council. There was little doubt how the trial court was going
..

to rule on any motion Tower placed before the trial court.
This Court ruled (earlier) that Tower does not have standing to pursue a quiet title action.
And, that Tower would having standing to seek injunctive relief if Tower can demonstrate it has
a legal right to benefit from the easement. Rather, than pursue the course of action this case was
remanded back to the lower court for, Tower chose to delay, obstruct, and hinder the
administration of justice, by presenting a gross misinterpretation of this Court's earlier ruling.

,

The Lawrences ask this court to enjoin Tower's use of the Lawrence property and for a monetary
award for all lost revenue and all fees and damages the Lawrences have had to incur defending
this action.

,
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